Introduction: Psychosocial dimensions of human rights
In a recent review article on human rights in crisis, Jim Whitman states that 'human rights would amount to very little if they were not a lived expectation' i . To be a lived expectation, however, human rights must be a part of everyday subjectivity and mundane communication. Thus the black letter of the law, he suggests, 'gains its strength' from the 'broadly shared understandings' that the law formalises and embodies. It is therefore relevant to systematically examine the various ways in which non-experts understand human rights, and not least because the doctrine of human rights promises to supply the shared moral basis and common evaluative framework for the legal and political regulation of the contemporary geo-political order With such significant aspirations at play, however, it is perhaps unsurprising that human rights are typically presented as a completely objective, consensual affair.
Following the lead of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the various conventions and resolutions that followed, they are presented as inalienable universals inherent to all human beings. Italian human rights philosopher Norberto Bobbio v , for example, insists that the important thing is not to question the reality of human rights, but to get down to the difficult business of enforcing them (and, we might add, of educating people about them). The important thing is to get people thinking and acting in the right way, not to have them debate what that 'right way' indicated by human rights is. This is doubtless because human rights, and their predecessors the 'rights of man' serve as the foundation for a just and democratic society. Upon their objective definition and protection we pin the hopes of future justice and emancipation and of the maintenance and future promotion of human welfare and wellbeing. Human rights, in this sense, are an essential principle of unification for justice against illegitimate violence and exploitation.
They articulate and protect what we humans have in common. Hence there is an understandable tendency to 'black box' the possibility that different people might have rather different things in mind when discussing human rights.
Given the global importance of human rights, and given the ontological claims at play about fundamental human nature, it is rather striking how comparatively little psychologists have contributed to the field of human rights scholarship vi . Most of the little that has been written comes under the header of public 'attitudes towards' human rights. In this attitudinal research, the concept of human rights is simply taken for granted as an object about which various different subjective opinions can be stated, such as degree of support for human rights. Hence we are told such things as that, on average, over the last 30 or so years, 42% of US citizens consider it 'very important' to promote and defend human rights abroad, but most believe it considerably more important to protect US jobs and to control immigration and illegal drugs vii . In such research, the object 'human rights' is assumed to have a firm and objective referent about which any number of subjective views can be expressed. No contribution is made to the core problem of defining or legitimating human rights viii . The key problem such attitudinal research faces, however, is that 'human rights' is far from being a simple and singular object about which opinions can be straightforwardly expressed. It is therefore rather unclear whether the different attitudes identified in relation to human rights refer in fact to the same object. Whilst these findings have re-assuring face validity, the issue of what it is that participants are in fact endorsing, committing to and restricting when they so relate to 'human rights' as mediated by these various measures remains unclear. For certain, the version of human rights at play in this study is a markedly US version that de facto refers to human rights issues as purely a matter of benign US Foreign Policy (notably that relating to 'non-democratic governments' and 'cultural traditions' and as expressed in scenarios describing the Rwanda genocide, etc.). This operationalization of human rights is perhaps excusable in a study of US attitudes to a distinctively US construction of human rights, but it would be unworkable practically anywhere outside of this context.
McFarland and
The present paper attempts to go directly to the heart of the problems discussed above by inquiring into whether and how a sample of participants actually 'make sense of' human rights in different ways. That is to say, rather than assuming that people express diverse evaluations and orientations towards a shared object, the aim is to explicate the sense in which very different 'objects' might be at play within the apparent unity of the phrase 'human rights'. The working hypothesis is that there will be neither a unitary understanding of human rights, nor an infinite multiplicity of idiosyncratic constructions. Rather, the expectation is of a finite diversity of distinct forms of understanding extant in any given place and time. The implication is that disagreements about human rights may actually pertain to rather different 'objects' and that superficial agreements in attitude might likewise conceal deeper underlying conceptual differences.
A direct examination of this issue thus promises to enhance communicative possibilities.
This expectation of diversity is informed by the fact that a comparable finite diversity is discernable even amongst professional experts (legal, political and philosophical) 'what proportion of a given population agrees with a given proposition?'), but to capture and describe any actual patterns that are expressed by a given number of participants.
The basic procedure thus involves having a small and strategically sampled cohort of participants sort a large number of thematically related propositions into a meaningful holistic pattern according to some criterion of subjective judgement (e.g. 'agreement / disagreement'). Each participant thus provides a snap-shot of their subjective viewpoint in so far as it is expressed through their arrangement of the statement set. Each Q sort, once completed, can be represented in purely numerical form. The similarities and differences between various complete Q sorts (i.e. not between individual items) can then be expressed as correlations. These correlations can in turn be subjected to a by-person factor analysis. xxiii Through this process it is possible to identify any common modes of understanding expressed by participants, since these are detectable as patterns or clusters of highly inter-correlated Q sorts. These patterns are known as 'factors'.
In the Stainton Rogers and Kitzinger study, 5 such patterns were selected for interpretation amongst the Q sorts of the fifty seven participants. Each factor gathered together the Q sorts of those participants who had sorted the items into essentially the same pattern, but, importantly, a pattern clearly distinct from the others. The statistical analysis, of course, deals only with numbers, but clearly the reason for the shared numerical pattern is that each factor captures a distinct (shared) mode of understanding.
The key strength of this method, then, is that any factors that do in fact emerge are the direct result of the sorting activity of the participants. What remains is to interpret the sort patterns of each factor in order to reconstruct the content of the understanding. This requires a careful examination of the entirety of the sort pattern that typifies each factor, since it is the sort pattern as a whole that matters, not merely the position of any single statement. Usually, to simplify the process of interpretation, the Q sorts of all of the participants that exemplify a given factor are merged together statistically to yield a single Q sort that can serve as a representative of the factor for purposes of interpretation (called a 'factor array'). The particular arrangement of the statements on each factor array can then be carefully inspected in order to reconstruct the understanding informing each factor.
Of great interest is the fact that the five understandings of human rights uncovered by Stainton Rogers and Kitzinger correspond rather closely to the Dembour typology. 
The first (entitled Rights as grounded universals), corresponds closely to

A report of two new studies
The degree of overlap described above is somewhat surprising given the different methods, different data and different participants involved in Dembour's study and that of Stainton Rogers and Kitzinger. It suggests that the typology may be deeply rooted and may generalize across the divide between expert human rights author and lay person. To further explore these possibilities, two variations on Stainton Rogers and Kitzingers' study were designed and executed. Firstly, to further explore the possibility that a similar typology might emerge from a sample of people with little or no known engagement with human rights activity, a Q methodological study was undertaken using a sample of undergraduate psychology students from a metropolitan university in the UK (study A).
Second, the same set of statements was administered to a strategically sampled group of UK-based (predominantly non-student) lay people (study B). For both studies twenty five statements from the Stainton Rogers and Kitzinger study were used (those that best distinguished their five factors) and seventeen new statements were added on the basis of an updated literature review and five interviews. This yielded an item set of forty two statements (see appendix 1). Using a different set of statements obviously provides a more stringent test of the robustness of the previous typology, since comparable findings would imply that the same understandings can be expressed via different propositions xxiv .
The sort task was also modified slightly from the 1986 study. In both studies participants were asked to sort the items into a quasi-normal distribution ranging from most disagree (marked with -6) through neutral (marked with 0) to most agree (marked with +6)
according to the following pattern:
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 = ranking position 1 2 3 3 4 5 6 5 4 3 3 2 1 = no. of statements in this position
In short, each participant was given a shuffled pack of 42 statements, each typed onto a separate card. After reading through the pack, each participant was asked to select the statement with which they most agree, and to place it under a pile marked +6. They then placed the next two most agreeable statements under the +5 pile, and so on through +4, +3, +2 and +1. Items that they had no particular view about or considered neutral were placed under 0. The process was then repeated for the item most disagreed with (which was placed under -6), and so on through the minus piles. Participants were asked to continue adjusting the sort until they were happy that it reflected the view they wished to express. After recording the numbers of the statements in a matrix corresponding to the pattern above, each participant was then asked for qualitative open-ended comments elaborating upon their reasons for sorting the statements in the extreme piles (and any others they wished to comment on). The whole process took between 40-60 minutes.
Study A: Constructions of human rights amongst undergraduate psychology students at a metropolitan UK University 84 completed sorts were returned from a cohort of undergraduate psychology students taking a first-year lab class. 11 of these were male. 62 were British, 7 were Chinese, 5
were from other European countries and the remaining 4 were from Argentina, Bahrain, Egypt and Pakistan. After examination of the scree slope, from a larger set of factors revealed by a by person principle components analysis using SPSS, 5 clear factors were selected for interpretation (together these account for 51.3% of the study variance). A first large factor accounts for 29% of the variance and the Q sorts of 36 of the participants correlate significantly xxv with this factor alone. These Q sorts can hence be referred to as exemplars of this understanding. The next 4 factors are also comparatively substantial, having eigenvalues of 7, 6.4, 4.7 and 4.2 respectively xxvi . Thereafter the factors become less substantial and less interpretable.
As discussed above, to aid interpretation of the understandings, factor array Q sorts for each factor were calculated using factor scores xxvii . The section below provides an interpretation of each factor and is written in a manner designed to provide direct insight into this process of interpretation. The interpretations are primarily based upon the ranking of the statements in each factor array, but where relevant open-ended comments from exemplars are included to enhance and validate the interpretation.
Understanding A1: Rights as grounded universals.
Despite the altered item set, this understanding is immediately recognizable as the first account identified by Stainton Rogers and Kitzinger. The details of this can be illustrated by attending to the ranking of certain key statements in the factor array Q sort, although, as will become clear, ultimately it is the complete sort as a gestalt that is the focus of attention. In the text below each numbered statement is followed by the ranking it received in the relevant factor array Q sort (we will call this first factor 'A1'). Hence item 12 (below) was the statement with which this first understanding most agrees (ranked at +6). Understanding A1 presents a view of human rights as moral universals that apply to all individuals regardless of time and place:
12. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights -+6 in other words, human rights are universal.
13. Human rights have always existed as part of an external "natural law" +3 which we have gradually discovered and made explicit.
20. All citizens should be entitled to exercise the same rights. +4
14. Human rights are unchanging principles of moral philosophy -+5 like justice, freedom and equality.
Consistent with the above rankings, any suggestion that human rights may be tied to history or culture is firmly rejected. No exceptions are to be permitted on the grounds of cultural difference and no privilege is to be accorded to insiders. Note the negative ranking of the following statements (excluding 32), indicating moderate to strong disagreement:
15. The idea of human rights is a political invention.
-4
42. We should not expect human rights to be respected -5
in cultures that work with very different values.
37. For me, claims to rights are associated with the selfishness of a culture that always puts the individual first.
4. All other things being equal, the rights of our own country people should take precedence over the rights of those of other nationalities.
-4 32. If human rights are being systematically abused in a country, the international community has a duty to intervene. +3
Given this strong sense of the absolute unconditionality of rights, it is not surprising that strongest disagreement is reserved for the idea that human rights must be earned:
1. Human rights should not be seen as automatic; one should earn and qualify for them by being a responsible citizen.
-6
Understanding A2: Rights in radical political discourse
The second understanding to be examined also replicates its namesake in the Stainton Rogers and Kitzingers' study.The most positively ranked items express a vision of human rights as concerned with power, conflict and the struggle against injustice and inequality:
7. One of the most important roles of human rights is in protecting minorities against the tyranny of the majority. +6
9. An essential right in a free society is the right to disobeythe right to dissent from all the commands of legitimate authority. Interestingly, as in the Stainton Rogers & Kitzinger study, this was the only understanding in which statement 11 is disagreed with. Hence, although the disagreement is mild, it should be considered as theoretically very significant:
11. All the human rights in the world can't prevent loneliness, disease, bodily decay and death. Human kind's fundamental vulnerabilities of -1 flesh and spirit are not susceptible to ideological or political correction.
Understanding A3: Rights as a socio-political construction
This understanding -much like its equivalent in the Stainton Rogers and Kitzinger study -puts the whole concept of human rights into critical question. Strongest agreement is given to statement 28:
28. Human rights are a political tool that can be used to do great good or great bad. +6
The view of rights as political constructions of ambivalent value rather than unchanging positive moral principles is reiterated in the following rankings:
31. 'Human rights' are increasingly being used as a slogan to pander to the whims of the 'politically correct'. +4
Human rights are imported into developing countries just like Big Macs, Cola and Hollywood films. +5
39. Respect for human rights is the ultimate sign of moral progress.
-3
Underlying this critical account is a negative view of the real interests of the state:
6. To expect the State, the Police and the Law to defend human rights is like expecting foxes to protect chicken runs. +5
This picture of a malign and deceptive state is combined with an image of the ordinary citizen as powerless:
22. There is not much the ordinary citizen can do if they feel their rights are being abused. +2
Given this critique it makes sense to support the idea of examining the specifics of each problem situation rather than imposing a vocabulary of rights onto it:
25. The solution to any human problem should be based on that unique situation, not on some general idea of what people's +4
"rights" are or should be.
We should not expect human rights to be respected in cultures that work with very different values. +3
Largely in common with the first two understandings, extreme disagreement is reserved for items which blame rights violation on criminality and wickedness and which hint at making human rights conditional upon 'appropriate' conduct:
24. It is not hard to see who, in our society, are the worst abusers of the rights of others -it is the criminals and the law breakers. sense to say that they have a right to those actions.
Understanding A4: Rights and responsibilities
This understanding also has its equivalent in the Kitzinger and Stainton Rogers study, and, arguably, is closest to Dembour's 'deliberative scholars'. It also offers a critique of the concept of human rights:
28. Human rights are a political tool that can be used to do great good or great bad. The basis of this critique, however, is completely different to that of understanding A3.
The A4 account, for instance, thoroughly embraces the idea that human rights should be conditional upon good conduct:
16. Some people behave so badly as to forfeit their rights as human beingsmass murderers and some sex offenders, for example. +6
21. It is only reasonable that certain groups (e.g. prisoners, the mentally ill)
should be denied the use of certain rights (e.g. voting) that the rest of us take for granted. +4
24. It is not hard to see who, in our society, are the worst abusers of the rights of others -it is the criminals and the law breakers. +4
A qualitative comment from participant 60 (an exemplar of this factor) sheds light on the reasoning behind this account: 'You shouldn't act towards one another in brotherhood.
Some people don't deserve it!'
It is not surprising, given this emphasis, that there is strong disagreement with the notion of a 'right to disobey', and with the idea that rights are connected with a history of collective dissent and struggle:
9. An essential right in a free society is the right to disobeythe right to dissent from all the commands of legitimate authority. 4. All other things being equal, the rights of our own country people should take precedence over the rights of those of other nationalities.
-5
This association of religion and human rights is not absolute, however, and at points the two can be dissociated:
28. Human rights are a political tool that can be used to do great good or great bad. +4
Human rights alone, in other words, are not enough. Indeed, the sense conveyed is that, rather than being absolute foundations themselves, human rights need to be based upon a foundation of compassionate consideration:
29. The ability to respect human rights is based upon people becoming more compassionate, caring and considerate of others. +3
11. All the human rights in the world can't prevent loneliness, disease, bodily decay and death. Human kind's fundamental vulnerabilities of flesh and spirit are not susceptible to ideological or political correction. +2
This introduces a distinct conditionality into the issue of human rights. Hence, although there is mild agreement with the proposition that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights (12 = +2), this is clearly not taken to imply that human rights should apply regardless of the particular circumstances involved:
2. If the notion of human rights means anything, it must apply to all of the people all of the time, regardless of their place in society or the nature of the situation they are in.
-2
Having one's human rights respected, in this account, is conditional upon having earned those rights through fulfilling ones duties and responsibilities to the community:
1. Human rights should not be seen as automatic; one should earn and qualify for them by being a responsible citizen. +5
18. I believe that I can only reasonably expect my rights to be respected by society if I fulfill my duties to society. +2
But it does not follow that those who, for example, break the law, should be denied their human rights:
24. It is not hard to see who, in our society, are the worst abusers of the rights of others -it is the criminals and the law breakers.
-4 21. It is only reasonable that certain groups (e.g. prisoners, the mentally ill) should be denied the use of certain rights (e.g. voting)
that the rest of us take for granted.
A comment from participant 4 is relevant here: 'we cannot judge… or take away rights -
this is not our duty or role -only God's'.
A final important aspect of this account is a positive sense of the power of the ordinary citizen to act against the abuse of their rights:
22. There is not much the ordinary citizen can do if they feel their rights are being abused.
Study B: Constructions of human rights amongst a strategically sampled UK participant group
The second study used a strategically mixed sample of lay people xxviii . 46 UK-based participants took part, with ages ranging from 17 to 71, with a male to female ratio of around 2:3. Much as with the Stainton Rogers and Kitzinger study, theoretical sampling was used to select participants likely to express differing views on human rights.
Participants included lawyers, therapists, artists, lecturers, journalists, equality officers, designers, the unemployed, environmentalists, businesspersons, the retired, trade unionists, trainee priests, and teachers. As well as occupation, group membership was also considered, and although some participants were chosen because they did not have any active group membership, some were active within organizations to which human rights were an important issue. At least one participant was involved with each of the following groups : Amnesty International, the Conservative Party, War on Want, Free
Western Sahara Campaign, Friends of the Earth, Voices UK (pacifist group), Campaign Against Arms Trade, Minority Rights Group International, Rising Tide (environmental campaigning) Refugee Council, PEN, Index upon Censorship, Liberty, the Roman Catholic Church. Rather than repeat the lengthy interpretations provided for study A above, the results for study B will be presented in summary form with a focus on salient differences.
Following data analysis as above, the five most substantial factors were selected for interpretation, yielding:
1. Understanding B1: which correlates significantly with A1 and presents a version of rights as grounded universals; 2. Understanding B2: which correlates significantly with A2 and presents a version of rights in radical political discourse; 3. Understanding B3: which correlates significantly with A3 and construes human rights as a socio-political construction.
The first three of the five understandings from study A were thus replicated. The fourth understanding from study A (A4, rights and responsibilities) bifurcates in study B into two understandings (B4 and B5). In both B4 and B5, human rights are not viewed as automatic entitlements. Instead they are construed as benefits that are earned through the appropriate exercise of responsibilities and the fulfillment of duties to society. A clear distinction is thus drawn between law-abiding citizens and those who misbehave in ways that should lead to the loss of their rights. However, compared to B5, B4 is generally positive about the notion of human rights as a moral ideal, agreeing that all citizens are born equal in rights and should therefore be entitled to exercise the same rights. Turning to the differences between the two studies, a first issue is that study B yielded no direct equivalent to understanding A5 (rights and religious commitment to the community). There are also some subtle differences between the main accounts emerging from the two studies. Understanding B1, for example, has a strong religious aspect to it that was not evident in A1 There is also a slight difference in emphasis between understandings B2 and A2.
B2 is a more resolute and radical version of the protest dialect. The majority of the participants who expressed this account are involved with human rights activism groups such as Amnesty International. There is a stronger emphasis on the right to disobedience, and a championing of the ordinary person against the machinery of the state. As one participant put it: 'Dissent provides a safeguard against institutional tyranny'. Another difference is that B2 puts more positive emphasis upon the importance of conceiving human rights as universal and unconditional (although they disagree with ontological claims of natural law). This brings it marginally closer to the natural school account. As expressed by one B2 exemplar: '[H]uman rights have to apply to everybody otherwise there's no point in having them'. The A2 account was rather more circumspect about this issue.
Discussion and conclusions
The studies described above support the notion of a finite diversity of distinct ways of understanding of human rights. Perhaps most surprising is the degree of overlap between the understandings discernable through an analysis of the writings of human rights experts (as described by Dembour), and those expressed through the sorting of statements by non-experts xxix . Distinct natural, protest, discourse and deliberative understandings appear to be particularly robust, since equivalents to Dembour's schools can be found in Stainton Rogers and Kitzinger's study from over twenty years ago, in a recent study involving psychology undergraduates, and in a recent study with non-student lay folk, as summarized in table 1 below:
Insert . In A2, by contrast, the identification is incomplete, giving a transcendence to the religious perspective that allows it to justify human rights in some circumstances, but also to critique and 'correct' human rights as and when necessary.
The identification of these understandings should not lead us automatically to assume that we are dealing with personality variables that are stable at the level of particular individuals. Empirically, what has been identified are coherent gestalts or constructions. It is these that appear to be sufficiently stable to be identified at different times with different people using different methods. It is perfectly possible that a given individual might shift between understandings depending upon circumstances, just as they might wear different clothing for different occasions. From this perspective, the multi-dimensionality uncovered might be thought of as expressing the (complex) social reality of human rights itself. The suggestion would be that the domain of human rightsmuch like the famous duck / rabbit image beloved of gestalt psychology, has a tendency to reveal itself to our understanding according to its different aspects or sides.
Unlike these gestalt images, however, human rights appear to be multi xix From a theoretical perspective, one advantage of considering different ways of constructing the object 'human rights' is that it avoids an unbridgeable distinction between an out-there reality of human rights (the object) and a series of in-there perceptions (purely subjective attitudes). Rather than operate with a difference between representation and reality, it is more fruitful to consider the out-there realities of human rights as concrete actualities whose invention and perpetuation required and requires subjective input. This would avoid the realism / relativism impasse, to the extent that any invented actualities are objective constraints on future creations and experiences, but, at the same time, the importance of an existing matter of fact is nothing more than the part it plays in the becoming of tomorrow's actuality. xxiii In a by-person analysis patterns are identified between complete sorts, and hence it is complete Q sorts that load factors and not items. Q methodology is thus distinct from conventional factor analysis or 'rmethodology' which identifies patterns amongst items based on correlations between items. The epistemological implications of this matrix reversal are rather profound. In Q methodology, for example, the participants are the variables in the analysis and items are the cases (hence a relatively large number of items, rather than participants, is desirable). xxiv The down-side, of course, is that direct statistical comparison with Stainton Rogers' and Kitzinger's 1986 findings is not possible. xxv In this study a Q sort was considered to be a significant factor loader if it correlated at 0.45 or above on one factor only. xxvi An eigenvalue is the sum of squared values in the column of a factor matrix. A value over 1 is generally taken as an indicator of the minimal statistical significance of a factor. This, however, should be understood only as a minimal condition of interpretability based on the fact that eigenvalues below 1 account for less variance than is attributable to a single Q sort, and thus provide no advantage of data reduction. xxvii In effect, for example, the 36 Q sorts that significantly loaded the first factor alone were merged to form a single factor array Q sort. As discussed above, it is these factor arrays that are subjected to interpretation in order to reconstruct the subjective understanding informing the factor. See S. 
